Harare and Kampala: A Tale of Two Cities

“So far like the present period”

Very superficially, Zimbabwe and Uganda have a lot in common.  Both (with some politically driven exceptions) are quite close to the UK in cultural and society terms; and both are striving to retain or retrieve a reputation for growth, strength and stability.  Less superficially, they are also forms of a political mono-culture, increasingly built around the personality of either a very small group, or more especially one person.  Both countries are of interest to the UK, and to other – allied – donors and like-minded countries and organisations; and both seek to balance “traditional” donor and investment interests with those of “non-traditional” partners such as China, Malaysia and Turkey.

But clearly the two countries are also very different.  Zimbabwe is a form of pariah where even the non-traditional partners seem amenable to more “western” rhetoric about rule of law and stability (in part because not even they have been able to profit from their investments there).  Uganda apparently enjoys diverse international investment and hosts a range of donors with relatively well funded programmes.

Beneath these apparently different veneers run similar issues, just at different stages of gestation.  In each case, the governance culture (and the benefits it returns to ordinary people and international partners) is arguably in post-peak decline.  And both either face or have made choices which have cemented this downward trajectory.  Both face future choices which offer the chance to either arrest the decline or to embark on a new, more positive, path.  Or not.

“The spring of hope or the winter of despair”

In the case of Zimbabwe (where the decline is marked and advanced), proximate choices over future leadership will set the tone for the near future and ordinary people will be in for a rough ride in the near term.  The options appear to be spiralling off a cliff edge or bumping along the bottom whilst the political classes work towards generational change. 

In Uganda (which is still riding relatively high), the choice appears to be between an exclusive and increasingly self-interested political class and managing a transition over time which allows a younger generation to stretch their wings.

  

“We had everything before us; we had nothing before us.”

In Zimbabwe, a sense of wary fatigue seems to pervade donor counsels.  The next steps are all in the hands of the political elite and they must make their choices and live with the consequences.  There is a need to help ordinary people manage the change which affects them, but donors are not yet planning for this kind of future.  They are likely to do so, but probably too late to be really effective. 

In Uganda, where donors are clearly repositioning themselves to work around an immutable political culture, the opportunities are more (but not completely) concrete.  For some donors, the entry point may turn out to be managing local tension in areas (the north and the west) which host significant refugee communities.  Others are seeking much larger and broader programmes of support to the north with a focus on infrastructure and services.  But most acknowledge that governance will be an essential part of any larger package. 

Uganda: Back to the future?

Uganda is, in many respects, a remarkable success story. From a country wracked by a succession of avaricious leaders and a civil war, it has been regarded - since 1986 – as a bastion of stability, relative prosperity and a key partner in the promotion of regional and global security. (Although this effect is mostly confined to the prosperous south with the north still suffering the legacy of a vicious insurgency which pitched the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force murderously against each other and the population and which lasted well into the twenty first century.) Uganda is relatively easy to partner; and offers an educated and capable population which is industrious and (relatively) productive. But its apparent successes should not be taken for granted; and there are potential storm clouds on the country's horizon. The extent to which the international community sees what it wants to see in Uganda and papers over the rest should not be underestimated. Is Uganda at a tipping point or about to lift off? 

President Yoweri Museveni has been in power since 1986, governing initially through his so-called non-political “Movement” – a rule which has brought relative peace and stability to many but which has, however, done little to address the underlying tensions to be found in Ugandan society, not least those caused and exploited by the colonial administration. A self-styled “good thing”, Museveni’s pitch to his critics and opponents is that the country is not yet ready for a lighter touch administration. He holds out the prospect of chaos as the backdrop to any discussion about succession or transition to another form of regime. 

Since 1986 the population has grown from about 15 million people to approximately 38 million, with a population of in excess of 100 million forecast for 2050. At the same time, the country has developed a distinct youth bulge with 57% of the population below the age of 18 years; and another 21% of the population aged between 18 and 30 years. (1.8 million babies are born each year, with 58% of them being unplanned. 24.5% of all births are to teenage mothers.) Economic growth averages 3% annually, but only about 15% of the population currently works in the formal sector. (Although 73% of the population work – formally and informally – in agriculture, the sector only generates about 23% of the economy.) And inequality is rising fast with the bottom ten percent of the population sharing 2.5% of the economy and the top ten percent sharing 35%. 

To compound the problem of population growth, Uganda has a progressive policy towards refugees who currently number in excess of 1 million people, mostly fleeing the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and South Sudan. The country welcomes refugees; allows them to work; offers them land and services such as education and health; and seeks to settle them within existing communities rather than in camps. In the first months of 2017, refugees have arrived in Uganda at an average rate of 2,000 people per day. The anticipated cost of servicing the needs of this population (and the communities within which they are settled) is approximately USD 1 billion in 2017, although current donor commitments total no more than 22% of this figure. The effort is overseen by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) which deploys the resources it has to hand in a ratio of 70:30, refugees to local community. In this respect, the international community is subsidising the cost of service delivery to the local population; and any shortfall will have a local effect as well as an effect on the refugee population. 

Since 1986, Uganda has sought and welcomed international partnerships of almost all kinds. It has been a receptive destination for foreign direct investment; and has become a dependable partner in regional integration and security as well as a key ally in the promotion of global security. As time has gone by, Museveni has morphed from useful pragmatist to sage elder statesman in a range of fora including the Great Lakes, Somalia and South Sudan. He has been forward leaning – perhaps in light of his country’s landlocked status – on issues of regional integration in eastern Africa including through the East African Community (EAC). But his perception of Uganda’s national interest has been an – understandable – common theme in his regional and global diplomacy. 

Considered a strength for years, Uganda’s relatively rigid political structure has become increasingly synonymous with the personality of the President. Almost all key decisions are taken by him; and his world view (and, increasingly, politicised analysis) informs all major choices. At some point in the past – perhaps only really discernible with hind sight – Museveni’s leadership switched from the enlightened and necessarily despotic to the exclusive. Although this effect has been growing over time, it perhaps became clear following the lifting of Presidential term limits and the introduction of multi-partyism in a 2005 revision of the Constitution following a referendum. He has done little to foster an inclusive political culture; and the question of his succession remains open, likely to be decided upon by him alone. Instead around him has gathered a small group of family and close allies whose daily activity looks to be as much self-interested as anything else. The political opposition is weak and ineffective – not just because they have been kept so by the political culture, but because they are likely no better intentioned than the governing elite. State House has become a kind of parallel government, with officials and politicians elsewhere left having to second guess policy. The practical, if not planned, result of this is a hierarchy of local government and officials who hesitate to take initiatives for fear of being out of line, leaving the bulk of the population excluded from influence over their future; and poorly served by the present. 

But there is dissent, dissatisfaction and organisation running beneath the surface of an otherwise placid society. To a degree this is tolerated although the authorities act decisively when they fear that presages anything more than posturing. Young people, with little prospect of a conventional job, have taken to community organisation and the increasingly available (yet still expensive) internet to express their alternative vision for Uganda’s future. They rarely campaign overtly or on traditional political issues. But they use the convening power of information technology to organise relief work and to fundraise for people in need. This apparently harmless activity is perhaps made threatening by the sheer numbers of people involved, and has consequently attracted negative criticism from the President. Previously the preserve of (relatively wealthy) smart phone owners, Facebook is now accessible on a normal mobile phone using SMS technology. Official data suggests that less than 5% of the population routinely access the internet. But activists claim that they are able to reach nearly 40% of Uganda’s people directly and indirectly. Neither figure is likely to be correct, with the truth lying somewhere in between; and increasing competition in the mobile sector is driving data prices (and the cost of phones) down. But the issue is not so much the numbers as the effect of a narrow political culture which has driven almost all forms of political expression into the shadows of the internet. 

Discoveries of potentially exploitable oil reserves have cemented the country’s reputation for prosperity, although the oil is yet to flow and it is far from clear how much of the anticipated revenue – US$2-3 billion annually for 25 years – will actually translate into cash in the bank for government or people. In the plans and visions of government, much of the anticipated oil revenue is already allocated to ambitious plans to become a middle-income country by 2030. But there is a hint of complacency behind the planning because officials cite the country’s future wealth as the source of today’s recurrent expenditure. Short term, commercial loans are bridging the gap although it is not clear where (or when) the far side lies. And the simering tensions over land rights brought to the surface by the perception of future wealth remain almost entirely unaddressed. Meanwhile, the demands on the economy and the body politic grow on a daily basis with no apparent plan B for either. 

Economically, demographically and socially, the country is heading for a perfect storm of pressures which will require steady leadership, enlightened policy and strong, diverse economic growth. 

As Uganda enters the second decade of the twenty-first century (and Museveni the fourth decade of his rule), prices are rising, and corruption is a daily feature of everyone’s lives. The narrow foundations of the formal economy do not embrace the vast majority of people in the urban areas and exclude almost completely people in the rural areas. Oil revenue is not coming on-stream as government had hoped; and the political leadership looks stale and out of touch with the (fast growing) next generation. Perhaps rightly, Museveni believes that he is the person best placed to run the country – but he employs a directive and exclusive approach which does not foster political diversity or alternatives. Fearing the chaos that might follow his departure from office, the President is thought to be keen to revise the Constitution again in time to avoid falling foul of the provision which sets an upper age limit on Uganda’s Presidents. He needs to do this by 2021 if he is to stay in office. At the present time, it is hard to tell if this is a Canute-like reluctance to face the changing reality of Uganda, or a genuine concern to navigate the country through changing times. But as pressures grow within the country, and across the small political class, there is a likely shift in perception to come. Will the President’s rule adapt successfully to a changing economy and its associated governance demands? Or will he and his clique hold out stubbornly? And what will be the effect of this on Uganda’s international alliances and partnerships? Will Uganda go from being (nearly) everyone’s solution to being (nearly) everyone’s problem? 

The question of Uganda’s future identity is key in determining the country’s future path. As 2021 looms, the President has said publicly that a national debate will inform any Constitutional review. The extent to which any such debate is fully participatory and both represents and informs the views and interests of others remains moot. But there is no doubt that Ugandans have views. They just lack forums within which to debate their interests in a mutually respectful manner; and to have them heard and interrogated by others. In the absence of suitable “space” for debate, and as Uganda moves into a (more) digital age, there is a danger that the discourse will take place on social media, and that it will pass mostly unheeded by those in power. In an environment where much of Uganda’s social media space remains relatively immature, almost tabloid - and un-counterbalanced by more serious analysis - in nature, the promotion of both real world and virtual debating skills and space would be a real contribution to a Ugandan future conditioned by ordinary people in dialogue with their representatives and leaders. 

Against a backdrop of an immutable political culture which overlooks or marginalises ordinary people, there is also a need for the international community to navigate local governance issues carefully. Many donors in Uganda appear to have concluded that so-called “transformational change” is not possible in the current political context. Unable to anticipate change through high level engagement, these donors are now contemplating a more grass-roots approach. The vast majority of decisions which have a direct impact on ordinary people are taken at lower levels of government, often in or near the communities which they serve. The staid political culture of Uganda can lead local decision makers to be risk averse, avoiding initiatives which might not receive political approval from the levels of government above them. This drives two broad forms of potential tension: within communities between people and officials; and between communities and outsiders such as refugees.   Mitigating these tensions through the promotion of better, negotiated local partnerships to prioritise, manage and oversee the resources available will be a key consideration for the future in Uganda.

Zimbabwe: Old faces, new solutions?

 Zimbabwe's political context is conditioned almost entirely by the President's (apparently rapidly) failing health; and the jockeying around him for power and influence - both in the near term; and with an eye to future political (and in the case of the wider Mugabe family, legacy and financial) settlement. In this respect, Zimbabwean people are enjoying a period of relative stability as they are not directly affected by the machinations of the political classes who are too busy with their own interests for the moment. But change within Zimbabwe’s political classes can be swift, unpredictable and destabilising. 

There is a sense that change may be imminent (2-4 months), although whether this is through the death or retirement of the President is unclear. There is genuine uncertainty about how any political settlement or accommodation might play out within the party and/or within the country. But for now, it seems that Vice-President (Emerson Mnangagwa; EM) has managed to outwit his opponents and is in pole position to take over from the President. He does not enjoy unconditional - or even majority - support within the party, but by taking a number of policy initiatives (and thereby filling a vacuum) he has established an, at least temporary, first mover advantage. Critically, he appears to have neutralised what appeared to be the main threat to him and his group (the so-called Team Lacoste after the crocodile like tendency to lurk, observe and pounce; but also the clothing brand) from a coalition of the First Lady and a younger faction within ZANU-PF informally known as the G-40 (after the Constitutional provision that Presidents must be at least 40 years of age). The First Lady appeared to have moved decisively against him in recent months, but EM has regained the advantage for now. She will not, however, go quietly; and she has the President’s ear in a way that no-one else has. 

The big question - now - is what EM might do with power. There are some suggestions that he has sought and made alliances with ZIPLA and ZANLA, and in so doing has made himself more acceptable to the War Veterans (whose declaration for the MDC of last year may or may not still stand). He also appears to be acceptable to senior officers in the military. And he has made undertakings to the President about the future safety and welfare of the Mugabe family (although they are unlikely to take these at face value.) It looks, therefore, as though he could currently command the "state" (higher echelons of the party, the government and the security apparatus). But he does not command the "street" - where ordinary people, left to a free choice, would probably choose from the opposition parties. This makes an election in June 2018 a key point of vulnerability for him. (Although as the architect of the resounding ZANU victory in 2013, he surely knows how to solve this problem if necessary.) 

But there may be a more pragmatic solution in the wings. Aside from the convictions of a very small group around the President, the actual policy differences between ZANU and MDC (led by Morgan Tsvangirai; MT) are really very small. Both want to solve the land problem and to reverse the indigenisation strategy - essentially as a necessary kick start to the economy. And both recognise, within limits, that corruption needs to be substantially reduced. Both also recognise that an election is likely to be contentious, volatile and potentially violent. At the same time, Zimbabwe's economic crisis is deepening and, although an oft repeated view over the years, must be on the verge of spiralling out of control. Pragmatism may drive the various protagonists to an accommodation which sees some form of Transitional National Government (TNG) installed without a full election along with a sunset clause leading up to generational change in the leadership of both ZANU and MDC in the future. Such a deal, if backed by donors and key influential powers, could offer a way 

forward without the apparently mandatory violence and rigging which has been the hallmark of recent elections. 

The nature of a possible deal between MDC and ZANU - or, more likely, between EM and MT- would be hard fought; and would have to cover a wide range of potentially contentious issues, such as security sector reform, economic reform, electoral reform and governance reform. It would need to be backed by substantial funds - estimates range between USD 15 and 30 billion over ten years - and would need to be carefully monitored to ensure compliance in all sides. Such negotiations, were they to take place, could only be held outside Zimbabwe. And their pace would be conditioned by Mugabe's health. 

For the deal to mean any more than just the re-arrangement of the deck-chairs of power on Zimbabwe's Titanic, it will need to include some form of process which acknowledges the hurt and pain suffered by all sides during the liberation struggle; the gestation of the new Zimbabwe; and the years since independence. Alongside this, there will be a clear need for "space" within society to discuss the issues which affect its members; and for well thought out communications strategies on the part of government, the opposition and donors. 

There is some suggestion that arrangements for TNG negotiations might have already begun. There is, apparently, tentative agreement to dismantle the hard centre of security management in Zimbabwe (The Joint Operations Command; JOC) and to replace it with a National Security Council co-chaired by EM and MT; and there have been discussions about how Cabinet might be managed under a TNG (some kind of alternating Chair is perhaps envisaged). South Africa is reported to be keen to host and broker the negotiations, as much as a prop to Jacob Zuma's beleaguered reputation - and perhaps as a distraction from the domestic political problems which he is suffering at home. There are suggestions that discreet contacts have been made with key outside interests, including China, the US and the UK - all of whom are reported to be keen to hear more. (In this respect, a relatively non-traditional alliance of donors might be possible as no-one is getting what they want from Zimbabwe now, and everyone fears the national and regional consequences of a descent into civil war and total economic (and perhaps humanitarian) collapse. 

Whatever happens - deal or no deal - Zimbabwe is in for a rocky ride in the near future. Not even Singaporean health care can sustain the President indefinitely. His near-term departure from office currently offers the prospect of the least-worst way forward - EM and MT in some kind of TNG sustained by a donor funded emergency package and with elections deferred for, perhaps, another five years. The President's retirement - to a position of Father of the Nation, or some such honorific - would permit the transition to be managed best. But time may be against this option. The more time that passes, the more chance that the political sands will shift. EM and MT's interests align in this respect. 

Somalia: Whose maritime security? And for what purpose?

It has been a busy week for Somalia - and Somali watchers.  Another in a series of international conferences on support to that country has come and gone with plenty of fine words and lots of apparent commitment.  And indeed, it rather looks as though there is cause for optimism.  A new President, installed after a much more representative political process than his predecessors, has taken office to popular acclaim; and key agreements about how to secure the country have been reached.  Challenges abound, not least the humanitarian situation, security service delivery, government capacity and the need for a growing resource base.

A recurring theme in any discussion on Somalia is that of maritime security.  However well intentioned, such discussions inevitably segue into a discussion about piracy; and before long will disappear down a rabbit hole characterised by naval terminology.

But in these discussions, it is not always clear if maritime security is a means or an end.  And exactly whose maritime security is really under discussion.

Clearly, piracy is a problem for a broad range of actors.  It disrupts international trade and drives up prices (and delivery times) for items essential to life in many parts of the world.  It threatens the safety of mariners; and causes untold distress.  Furthermore, it - or the criminal networks which direct it - almost certainly contributes to insecurity inside Somalia including through the provision of funds to domestic and trans-national terror networks.  (That said, in an environment with little on offer by the way of alternative livelihoods, it also provides a living - albeit risky - for some Somalis.)  So piracy is a bad thing and it must be countered.

But as a result of this widely shared view, the policy discussion always seems to start with the symptom and not the cause.  It always starts with security - or more accurately, insecurity.  In this respect, there is a real (at least presentational) danger that maritime security becomes the desired end state.  However, for a country as poor as Somalia, maritime security is arguably really only a point of departure.  Once the maritime space is secure, what happens next?

With the growing (but still nascent and weak) maturity of the government in Mogadishu, it is surely time to shift the centre of gravity of this discussion from the problem (maritime insecurity) to the real desired end state (the sustainable exploitation of Somalia's maritime domain as a contribution towards equitable national development).  Once the potential value - to Somalia - of the maritime domain is identified and quantified, the logic of tackling maritime insecurity becomes both a national priority for national interest and a shared global priority for global interest.

Moving the discussion on from maritime security to maritime economy will more clearly help to identify exactly whose security, and whose interests, should be at the heart of the debate; and will help the land-based Somalis who watch the world's navies steam by understand that they too have an interest in what is going on in their waters.

Adaptive programming

Adaptive Programming

Key conclusions

·      Sustainable change is behaviour change.  Understanding the incentives which govern why people do what they do is essential.

·      Learning is essential. Programmes that cannot learn cannot operate in a dynamic or challenging context.

·      Opportunity matters.  Change - of any kind - is not guaranteed to happen; and sometimes the difference between success and failure can be down to how programmes make opportunity work for them.

·      Know your donor.  Getting to know the people who will make choices about programmes – both before they start and when they are underway – makes dealing with challenge and change easier.

·      Identity counts.  Programme teams need to be more than “just another donor”; and be able to work across cultural, political and economic divides. History in a context and working to build trust, collaboration, understanding and inclusion matter.

Adaptive programming

Donors are increasingly seeking adaptive approaches to delivering development programmes.  Whilst there is plenty of theory about the approach such as  this, there is somewhat less helpful guidance on how to go about it, although this, this and this offer some sensible starting points.

Development is about politics

Development is an ever evolving discipline.  It is increasingly recognised to be a political intervention.  And often the desired outcomes for development programmes implemented in complex environments are really about achieving change.

There is a growing body of literature about this.  Thinking and Working Politically (TWP), Doing Development Differently (DDD) and Problem Driven, Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) are some which shape donor approaches today.  And there is a growing interest in understanding how change happens as well as awareness that the answer is rarely purely technical.

But such programmes are seldom merely about a single developmental outcome.  Increasingly, donor interventions take place in the wider context of donor interests which (depending on the context) might include global security, trade promotion and/or the rule of law.

Understanding the wider backdrop to donor interests is key to delivering the programmes that they fund.

No actor is neutral

Although many development practitioners like to think of themselves and their organisations as neutral, the truth is that they are not. 

The perceptions of others are what really count.  And understanding how those perceptions might colour a potential partner’s engagement with a programme is key. 

Recognising that donors and the groups who implement their programmes are usually assumed to have an “angle”; and understanding what it might be and how it influences the behaviours of others is vital. 

Politics is about life

Key to successful implementation of an adaptive programme is understanding where power lies; why change happens; and how.  Understanding the incentives – and disincentives - which play on the people who make the choices is key to this.  And some of those incentives might not be the ones which implementers and donors would wish them to be.

Implementers of adaptive programmes also need to understand that they are governed, to a degree, by the domestic politics of their – sometimes multiple - donors too.  Like the local context, donor priorities and interests change over time.  So keeping a careful eye on wider donor policy objectives is a key task too.

  

Shaping an intervention

Making sure that a proposed programme is well founded and has realistic expectations of the changes that are possible is vital to programme success.  Working with partners and also with donors to help them understand the art of the possible is a core programme activity.  In this respect it is as important to understand the political economy in which the donor operates as it is to understand the one in which citizens and potential partners operate.

Life is about people

The logical starting point for this kind of programming then, is to begin with where people find themselves now; and then to go with the grain, accompanying them on their journey rather than a route defined by others.  Understanding how people interact with the politics of their context, with institutions and with donors is therefore essential.  They will be as much governed by the class, family, ethnic group, religion and society from which they come as by a shared understanding of the anticipated developmental benefit of a proposed donor programme. 

Learning to read and understand the motivations of key actors is essential.  Complex political economy tools are available, but the Everyday Political Analysis (EPA) tool is a straightforward and helpful starting point.  The essential point of this activity is to generate a shared understanding and analysis of the political context that informs all the relevant actors – citizens; partners; programme staff; and donors.  How this shared analysis is arrived at and maintained will depend on the context and the motivation of those involved.  But this kind of political economy work should be seen as a process more than a product; and should be considered a live and evolving activity.

Skilful navigation

Within this context, then, the ability of the implementer of a programme to convene all the actors in a safe space and to understand the wider context is essential.  The art of delivering an  adaptive programmes is the ability to understand and work towards a wider programme goal whilst all the time fine tuning implementation against the back drop of what is politically possible.

Traditionally development programmes have planned to work in an orderly way through a series of milestones towards a clearly defined end point – much like orienteering, a sport in which contestants run from known fixed point to known fixed point as quickly as possible. 

But adaptive programming is a little bit more like sailing a boat in stormy weather.  In order to arrive at the desired destination, “skilful navigators” need to work constantly to adapt to the effect of wind and tide; and always need to know exactly where they are, bearing in mind that sometimes it is necessary to go backwards in order ultimately to make progress.  In this way, the final destination is reached by the most efficient possible route – even if, thanks to the elements, it was not the one upon which the sailor had originally embarked.

Key conclusion:

Sustainable change is behaviour change

Development programmes cannot, alone, bring about change.  But they can influence the behaviour of the people who make up society and its institutions.  The essence, then, of adaptive programming is to promote behaviour change in order to influence the rules of the game and to contribute towards change over time.

People shape the context

As with the pressures which play on the people with whom an adaptive programme might work, the context within which it operates shifts all the time.  This requires programmes constantly to monitor the environment within which they work; and to test and adjust their stance and interventions on a continual basis.

Over time, the practice of monitoring the context continuously translates into a form of learning culture.  Rather than continuously discovering “new” aspects of the environment, adaptive programmes start to learn how the rules of the game play out.  They – the people they employ; the partners they reach; wider stakeholders - stop observing the system as outsiders and start understanding it as actors.  The ability to form and network relationships and understanding with and between this wide range of relevant actors is how the sum comes to add up to more than its parts.

Feedback counts

The ability to know that a programme is being effective is critical.  This requires an ability to gather and understand almost real time data.  Monitoring, evaluation and learning are vital tools in an adaptive programme.  They help the programme management to switch resources between activities based on a rapid assessment of the return on investment that they represent.  Perhaps more importantly, they provide a way for partners and programme management together to plan strategically in order to learn from both success and failure, and to realise a shared vision.  In this way, evaluation ceases to be something which is done “to” partners; and is welcomed as a part of forward thinking strategic planning.

But learning from success is only part of the story.  Understanding what has not worked – and why – is possibly more helpful than knowing that an intervention is working as predicted.  A programme culture which ranks success on an equal footing with an ability to draw positive lessons from any activities which do not deliver as anticipated is likely to be more successful than one driven by quantitative measures alone.  It is often the less successful interventions which offer the greatest potential for learning about how to be successful.

In designing a monitoring, evaluation and learning strategy for an adaptive programme, it is important to focus on the programme’s contribution towards a desired change, rather than only on the inputs that it has made. 

In this approach, care must be taken to avoid diluting or undermining the important issue of local ownership.  Adaptive programmes exist to support the efforts of others, not to create a profile for themselves.  The egos of the programme team – and any desire on the part of donors to “brand” success as theirs – needs to be left firmly at the door.   

Key conclusion:

Learning is essential

Without a designed-in capacity to learn, adaptive programmes will be unable to focus on their overall programme goals, leaving them vulnerable to mission creep or misplaced donor expectations.  Learning involves discovering not just “what” to do, but “how” to do it in the local context.  The learning that such programmes develop do not just shape their actions, but they inform the choices which are made about them by others.  Donors who understand the context better will make longer-term investments.  Partners who see that programmes understand their reality will engage more fully.

Conditioning the environment

Shaping the choices that donors make is a key opportunity – one which only really occurs before a formal decision to contract an activity is taken. 

Donor choices are not always as well founded as they might be; and may be a response as much to their domestic political context as anything else.   The view from within an Embassy is not always the same as the view of an Embassy from the outside.  Programme staff can play an important role in helping donors to remain focused on what is politically, technically and socially possible in the prevailing context.  But the extent to which this is possible from within an ongoing programme is limited.  Permanent in-country representation which pre-dates a programme and will endure beyond its end offers implementers a greater stake in the choices about what to do and how to do it.  Employing this capacity to shape donor choices and expectations before they are formalised is a useful investment in helping adaptive programmes hit the ground running.

Key conclusion:

Opportunity matters

Sometimes, despite significant efforts to promote change, nothing happens.  But at other times, change happens almost out of the blue.  Adaptive programmes cannot guarantee change, but they can help to promote opportunities for change. They can help to prepare for a time – or opportunity – which has not yet come.  Often, the key factor which makes change possible turns out to be chance. 

Natural disaster – or dramatic political change – can sometimes provide an opportunity for intervention.  Being positioned to identify and exploit such opportunities in a timely manner is an important capability of an adaptive programme.

Strategic patience

An essential element of conditioning the environment within which choices about what to do and how to do it are made is the need for time.  Many of the changes that adaptive programmes seek to promote may only become truly evident long after their formal end.  Although change might happen quickly, it might equally happen very slowly indeed; and it may be that a programme’s contribution to that change is difficult to discern until some time has passed.  Programme teams and donors need to understand the value of strategic patience in ensuring that their interventions can be as effective and sustainable as possible.  As a general rule, the stakeholders in a change have not read the logframe developed between donors and programmes; and will embrace change at their own speed and on their own terms.

Flexible approaches

Adaptive programmes are all about flexibility.  But having the actual flexibility to meet goals requires more than just an intellectual understanding of progress.  In the same way that the programme needs to be flexible, programme management needs to be able to adapt to a changing environment.  Fixed budgets and rigid staffing structures, as well as procurement mechanisms designed more for commercial contractors than fragile partners can all constrain a programme’s ability to be flexible and exploit opportunity.

Impressions count

Programme teams occupy a contested space between donors and local actors.  To be really effective in the local context – to play more than just a “donor” role – programmes need to draw on an identity that is attractive to partners; one which inspires them to work with the programme in the way that it wants and needs.  Adaptive programmes need to be able to convene people in safe spaces, to facilitate processes, help to connect expertise to issues and facilitate the development of capacity.  Key to this is legitimacy.  This legitimacy stems from the ability to employ the right people; to empower them with knowledge and understanding; adopt ways of working with others that demonstrates respect for local agendas; and is based on enduring and trusting relationships founded on shared values and principles.

Implementers of adaptive programmes need to be clear about “who” they are; and in whose interests they are working.  Maintaining at least a local perception of independence from donor politics is essential.  This task is made considerably easier if the programme team can trade on a long established reputation for trust, understanding, collaboration and inclusion. 

Key conclusion:

Know your donor

Hidden beneath the formal language of donor positions and contracts are real people.  Understanding them, and the pressures and incentives which play on them (including as, over time, the key personalities change), is every bit as important as understanding the local context.  Developing positive relations with donors helps to smooth out the dialogue with them, ensuring that challenges and changes can be explored in a neutral manner.  Where you have multiple donors, time spent upfront harmonising their focus is time well spent.

Key conclusion:

Identity counts

Who you are matters just as much as who you represent.  It conditions how interlocutors perceive programmes; and how they respond to it. As the implementer of a donor funded programme, people’s expectations of your interests and conduct will be shaped from the outset.  How you work in an inclusive way to increase collaboration and develop shared understanding between actors will also, over time, determine the level of trust in your programme. Managing and shaping partner perceptions (as well as donor and other local perceptions) is key; and seeking to be more than just another donor matters.