EU/Africa: Ten years of the Africa Peace Facility

The European Union (EU) is evaluating the first ten years of the Africa Peace Facility (APF).  The APF was established following the African Union (AU) Summit in Maputo in 2003 as a means to finance (i) the development of African peace support capacity; and (ii) African-led peace support operations (PSO).  It was originally funded from left over European Development Fund (EDF) resources – although it has from time to time been topped-up bilaterally by EU member states.  The EDF origins of the APF have led to a rhetoric about shared ownership of the resources.  Since it began, the APF has disbursed slightly in excess of one billion Euros – about 85% of which has gone on the financing the cost of various African PSO with the remainder spent on capacity building at AU and sub-regional level.

There appear to be differences of view within Europe about the purpose of the APF.  This is perhaps characterised by some who contrast a one billion Euro investment with the total inability of ECOWAS to deliver a force to Mali – despite funds specifically allocated to this.  But there are deeper tensions within Europe.  Support for the APF as currently constituted is not rock solid.  Africa (and some in the European Commission) would like to dispense with the capacity building element of the APF – largely because the PSO demand is vast and apparently bottomless; and partly because there are in fact other EU funds which could be used.  But altering the balance between conflict management (PSO) and conflict prevention (capacity building) within the APF would almost certainly destroy it as some EU member states think that the purpose of the APF is actually capacity building.

Atmospherics

After ten years of the APF, a great deal of positive change is evident.  The EU (at least at official level) is less patronising in its approach to the African partners and more willing to understand that the development process will be evolutionary and long. And the various African institutions rub along better than they used to.  But the question of subsidiarity is still not yet resolved in Africa.  This is leading to inefficiency and waste – both in terms of using donor funds and in terms of who does what in Africa.

Politics

The EU are clear that the APF is a funding instrument.  This (narrow and technocratic) position is what enables them to be patient in terms of actual improved African capability.  But it is quite clear that others in Europe are much clearer that they want some return for what is anyone’s book a large investment.  There is a relative lack of any strategic link between the activities (and goals) of the APF on the one hand; and Europe’s wider political-security interests and concerns on the other.  It is perhaps naive to assume that Europe will continue to pay out at this rate without some quid pro quo – a point which many Africans assume yet European seems to ignore.

Mission creep

The one area where European political-security interests seem to have had an impact is in the (always loose) definition of what the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) actually is.  In 2003/4, APSA was largely about building institutions and capabilities: the Peace and Security Council; the Africa Standby Force; the Continental Early Warning System; the Panel of the Wise.  Now the EU’s definition still includes these institutions but adds a number of specific effects or policy goals such as counter-piracy and maritime security.   Africa does not seem to actually share the EU’s political-security goals in their entirety.  The continent is still very much in a phase characterised by the management of operations and the development of institutional capacity.  There is a gentle divergence between African and European ambition developing.  This will likely lead to an increasingly a la carte approach to developing the APSA which is unlikely to be particularly helpful going forward.

C + C = C

Getting the best – for Europe and Africa – from a future incarnation of the APF will require more than just bureaucracy.  The officials of the various inter-governmental organisations have a key role to play.  They need to work to improve their cultural awareness of their partners within the APF; and to work to improve formal and informal communication between them.  These two Cs will lead to improved confidence leading in turn to better outcomes. The formula for future APF success ought to be: Culture + Communications = Confidence.

Kenya: Where has all the traffic gone? Long time passing..

The Kenya Airways flight banked over Nairobi giving the usual glimpse of the north and western suburbs, Wilson Airport and the Nairobi National Park. With barely a cloud in the sky, the full extent of the major roadworks around Kenya's capital was clear. But something was missing. There seemed to be almost no traffic moving around the city on this, Kenya's most important election day in many years. As the flight settled into its final approach, the normally log jammed Mombassa Road seemed equally deserted.

For the regular visitor to Nairobi, the lack of traffic is almost spooky. The city's traffic is very much like Kenya itself. It ebbs and flows, forming up behind obstacles and eventually overcoming them. It is brash and confident; and endlessly diverse. The mundane experience of sitting on a European motorway with its range of greys and people cocooned in their vehicles is far from the exuberant - but highly frustrating - business of navigating Nairobi's traffic. All manner of things are offered for sale - maps; ground nuts; curious devices for drying small items of laundry; fruit; DVDs; etc. All of Nairobi life is here and on display. Commuters in the Matatus; families combining going to work with the school run; people doing their make up in the passenger (and sometimes driver's) seat of the car to the sound track of revving engines, over amplified sound systems and beeps and hoots.

But not today.

The taxi driver drew up at the security post on the hotel perimeter. The usual smiling request to search the vehicle was replaced by a huge grin and a raised little finger on the guard's left hand. In the gleeful exchange which followed, the taxi driver - exhibiting his own left little finger to demonstrate that he too had voted today - declared us all "men of God". Although it was far from clear how, both men had recognised in each other a shared political ambition.

A group of Americans at the hotel seemed oblivious to the momentous events taking place in Kenya. They had, they said, had an amazing holiday into which they had packed more experiences of a life time than an ordinary mortal was entitled to expect. But the election had cast a shadow over their final day. Their drivers had wanted to vote.

The luxury of near deserted streets is unsettling. Hopefully tomorrow, Nairobi will be back to normal - and people will be wistfully reflecting on how easy it was to get around on 4 March. But if traffic, potholes and resentful tourists are the worst that Kenya has to contend with in the days following the election, the country will count itself lucky. Kenyans do not want - or need - more violence. Let's just hope that the political elite can remember that in the days and weeks to come.

Spending aid money on security

Poor people need security in exactly the same way that they need access to clean water, shelter, food, healthcare and education.  Security is a basic service and is the business of people, their governments and development programmes.  When poor people are safer, then their countries are more peaceful and stable – and the world is safer too.  Insecurity fuels the sense of economic, political and social marginalisation which fosters resentment towards an unequal world.  Improved security is, therefore, a direct benefit poor and rich, African and European alike.

Peace keeping vs peace support

Peace keeping – an essentially military activity which seeks to protect, promote and enable the political process of making peace – is an expensive and difficult task.  Peace support – an integrated civilian-military task – integrates peace keeping into a number of linked activities designed to help ensure that fragile and conflict afflicted states sustainably emerge into peace and security.  These activities include humanitarian assistance, development, economic support as well as the development of a culture of rule of law.  All require security.  But security cannot be imposed or achieved in a vacuum.  Security and development are two sides of the same coin.

Human security

Ordinary people should be the main beneficiary of improved security.  It is an essential element in improving their human security.  Human security links integrates their physical safety with their welfare.  Only when people are both safe and well can the stability of their community, country or region be assured.  Investments in security which do not identify ordinary people as the ultimate beneficiary are unlikely to effective.

Improved security planning

In the same way that development programmes seek to assist the governments of poor countries to improve their economic planning, helping governments to plan the development and direction of their security sectors is key.  Indeed, improved and integrated security planning can also help countries emerging from conflict to get to grips important aspects of both state and nation building too.

An important military role but not a military lead

The military can play an important part in helping countries effect the transformation from conflict to peace and stability.  Soldiers can often talk to other soldiers (including those newly in power) in a way that diplomats and others cannot.  And the military strengths of clarity of mission and translating political direction into operational reality fit well in the post-conflict environment.  But the overall task of delivering security in concert with development is primarily a civilian one; and is overwhelmingly strategic. 

An integrated approach

So if the UK is to spend more aid money on security and stabilisation, the military will often find themselves in the frontline of delivery but the goals towards which they are working must be set developmentally and politically.  In this respect, the suggestion that funds should be transferred from the Department for International Development (DFID) to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is poorly conceived.  A better approach would be to increase HMG’s ability to plan and act in an integrated manner – for example through mechanisms like the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) and the UK Stabilisation Unit.  Competing for Whitehall funding between Departments does not have to be a winner takes all game.  Fragile and conflict afflicted states need the British Government to practice what it preaches and to keep an eye on the big picture.

Global security and security sector development in Africa

Insecurity in Africa is increasingly acknowledged as a threat to global security. But tackling it often prioritises the interests of the international community at the expense of people in Africa and the Continent’s long-term stability. The nature of the threat is rarely traditional and military in nature, but has its roots in governance weakness. Narrowly focussed security-led interventions in Africa can lead to uneven development of African security sector capabilities. As a consequence, fragile and conflict afflicted states in Africa are at risk of becoming brittle – apparently strong but in fact inflexible and unresponsive to the needs of citizens.

Threats from Africa vs threats to Africa

Africa generates a number of threats to the wider world. These include migration driven by poverty, conflict and natural disaster; trans-national organised crime facilitated by lack of effective governance; terrorism; and piracy. These threats do not lend themselves to traditional military-security responses and the extent to which Africa itself is threatened by them is debatable. Few are actually the stuff of day to day security concern amongst ordinary Africans who are more likely to prioritise safety and security in their communities and the effects of corruption. Clearly international and African concerns share common roots. But the extent to which this is recognised by international security practitioners is limited.

Narrowly focussed security led responses

International efforts to counter insecurity from Africa often involve targeted interventions to address proximate threats. International concerns about terrorism often lead to the development of operational police and military units designed solely to partner international security agencies. The global impact of piracy often leads to the development of coast guard and naval capacities which characterise the maritime domain only as a source of threat to be controlled rather than as an economic resource to be regulated, policed and sustainably exploited.

Uneven security sector development

This narrow focus risks leading to the uneven development of African security sector agencies. Those agencies thought to be vital to tackling international security concerns receive the lion’s share of international support, whilst others – those more associated with the delivery of security as a basic service to ordinary people - receive little or no attention. This inevitably leads to a crisis of legitimacy for the security agencies in receipt of international support who are at risk of becoming increasingly capable but increasingly less accountable.

Integrated approach

Tackling insecurity in Africa in such a way as to address proximate global security concerns and the longer term developmental needs of African states requires an integrated approach. Security partnerships with Africa need to identify, enlarge and be built upon areas of genuine common interest. Building niche security sector capacities designed to counter a narrow spectrum of insecurity leads to uneven development of security sector capabilities and the inevitable de-prioritisation of the security needs of ordinary people. The international community – especially its donor agencies – needs to understand the links between development and security; and the need to work with African governments to make their security sector agencies accountable, adequate, affordable and appropriate. Security interventions in Africa which simply build the capacity of the governments to act robustly risk converting fragile and conflict afflicted states into brittle ones.

Guinea Bissau: One in the eye for multilateralism

Guinea Bissau has suffered an apparently endless cycle of assassinations and coups.  But the problems of the tiny West African country seemed attractively manageable – a  small but vociferous military; a corrupt political class; a desperately poor population.  The sights of the international community's (proxy) big guns focussed on Guinea Bissau.  Here was a conflict prone state where the international community could breeze in, preach and practice its post-conflict sermons and be successful before moving on in short order to other – more important – conflict areas like DRC, Somalia and South Sudan.

The European Union fired up a large military mission to deal with soldiers.  The United Nations established one of its Integrated Operations to deal with the politicians.  And as for the poverty…  Well, someone would get around to that when the security context was better.  What could go wrong?  With the world’s post-conflict architecture stepping in to deal with the situation, multilateralism looked to be in the ascendency.  Hooray!

But the various interventions made little headway.  Somehow, the EU’s efforts with the military never quite seemed to get off the ground.  Somehow the UN’s efforts were laudable but somehow never quite as successful as planned.  And somehow, it never quite seemed the time for the international community to sit and discuss with each other – and with the Government – exactly who would do what, how and when.  Surely, with such large and capable organisations apparently unable to make headway, the problem must be intractable indeed?

One by one, the brand names of the new world order slunk back to their bunkers.  For a while, it looked as though Guinea Bissau would continue to be a cancerous conflict in the region.

But then, Angola decided that enough was enough.  With a bit of effort and – admittedly – quite a bit of money, Angola decided to sort the problem out.  Pausing briefly to gather the odd Lusofone, Angola set about dealing with the military and the politicians.  And now, some semblance of normality seems to have set in.  Dispensing with the interminable hand wringing of the multilateral system, Angola just rolled up her sleeves and got on with the job in hand.  Her agility and decisive approach leaves the multilateral institutions looking like the maiden aunts of the international community.

Of course, there is no such thing as a free lunch.  And Angola’s commercial interests in Guinea Bissau provided plenty of incentive to get ahead.  But how many Bissau-Guineans would swap their new found relative peace and stability, bought with the coinage of Angolan commercial interests, for the good old days of multilateralism?

Sharing the Nile waters

Southern Sudan is set for independence.  Baring some unforeseen upset, it will join the community of nations in July 2011 as the 154th country in the world.  It faces a number of severe challenges, but one thing it has in abundance – water.  Or does it?

The use of the Nile waters is a particularly tricky issue.  Egypt relies on Nile water as it has almost no rain fall of its own to call upon.  And by long standing convention (set in stone by a decades old treaty), Egypt has the right to the majority of the water in the river.  Essential to Egypt’s economic survival, the bulk of the water comes from other countries in the region, particularly Ethiopia.  Egypt’s insistence on its rights is an obstacle to economic development upstream – a source of extreme irritation to the countries along the Nile’s course.

From time to time, the argument over how best to share the Nile water’s threatens to turn violent.  Some of the countries in the Nile Basin have begun to collaborate in order to demand a greater share of the river’s water.  They need to generate power, reduce poverty and drive economic growth.  The negotiations have gone on for years, and seem far from close to a resolution.

But thanks to Southern Sudan’s impending independence, the balance of power amongst the countries of the Nile Basin just might be shifting.  The amount of water allocated to North and South Sudan will have to be shared by the new country in the south and its new neighbour in the north.  But perhaps more importantly, Southern Sudan seems likely to fall in with Ethiopia and the countries of East Africa.  (A glance at a map shows the dividing line between the fertile south and the desert north starkly.)  The amount of water the countries agitating for change can draw upon between them won’t change a great deal by including Southern Sudan in their group.  But it gives the group an extra member and potentially a stronger position in the negotiations. 

In many respects, this argument may not matter very much to Juba at the moment.  (After the Nile is where it has always been.)  But countries such as Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia will be keen to embrace the world’s newest country – as much for trade and regional security as for its added weight in negotiations over the use of the Nile’s waters.  Juba will need to be wary of East Africans bearing gifts if it doesn’t want to disrupt a very delicate regional security balance.  One which, given the vital importance of Nile water to Egypt’s future, offers at least the potential for violent and destructive conflict.

JAB

Southern Sudan: The party begins

Southern Sudan today begins the process of formally separating from the North. Voting in the referendum begins today and will continue for some time. Voters are almost certain to vote for eventual independence, likely to be in July 2011. At that point Southern Sudan will bring the number of nations in the world to 193.  The world is arriving for the party.  And there is no doubting the popular will to succeed peacefully.

But voting on Sunday (or during the following week) only marks the begin of a process which is far from guaranteed to deliver safety and welfare for the new country’s citizens; or national or regional stability.  As the citizens and their guests celebrate the vote today, there is likely to be a long hangover tomorrow.

The sad truth is that those citizens of the world’s newest state who are poor, marginalised and insecure now will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.  Indeed once the unifying spirit engendered by the popular will to break away from the North dissipates, many domestic political, social, economic and security tensions which have been parked are likely to bubble up.  The morning after the night before will be fragile. 

Following a vote for independence, on the agenda are:

- reaching agreement with the North on how to address those issues necessary to separate the two states.  Currency, citizenship, land ownership, what to do about national security institutions and a host of other challenging issues need to be addressed.  Some – possibly all – of these issues can be parked until later.  But experience elsewhere in the region highlights the dangers of doing so.  Ethiopia and Eritrea parked the question of currency.  The resulting tensions arguably sparked the as yet unresolved border conflict.

- reaching agreement with the proliferating number of Southern political parties on the nature and composition of Southern Sudan’s government is not going to be easy.  There is already agreement that an interim government should include groups outside Salva Kiir’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).  But the question of which ones and who they represent is highly contested.

- At the same time, Southern Sudan needs to start delivering basic services to its citizens.  And to be seen to doing so.  In terms of need, the government in Juba is largely irrelevant to the majority of Southern Sudan’s citizens.  A de facto process of decentralisation has made State Governors more relevant to citizens than the national structures of government.  At best, this places instruments of power and resources in the hands of an individual closer to the needs of citizens.  But at worst, this creates centres of political and security power far from the centre.  Making government relevant after the vote is a key challenge.

As if these challenges were not enough, and independent Southern Sudan will radically alter the look and feel of the region.  Southern Sudan is clearly looking towards the East African Community.  And East Africa is reaching out to embrace the emerging country in a fraternal hug.  But Juba will need to be clear why its neighbours are so keen to keep it close.  Uganda and Ethiopia see Southern Sudan as an economic hinterland.  A place into which their commercial sectors can expand, helping to address domestic pressures such as rising unemployment.  Kenya and Ethiopia are keen to attract Southern Sudanese business for their ports.  (Of course, Ethiopia doesn’t have any actual ports but it has invested significantly in the transport infrastructure to both Djibouti and Berbera – both of which are closer to Juba than Mombasa.)  And Uganda and Rwanda are keen to help develop Southern Sudan’s oil refining capacity so that they are not so reliant on Kenya.  Finally, and looking much further ahead, Southern Sudan will be another significant Nile Basin state.  Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda (and to a lesser degree Eritrea and Kenya) badly want to alter the balance of power of the use of Nile waters. 

But for now, the government in Juba might also want to ask itself why they get so much attention from the United States.  It can’t just be brotherly love.  And the concerns of Southern Christian voters in the US don’t really explain it either.  Is it perhaps the case that the US have spotted the strategic potential of the country too?

So as the hangover clears, Juba will need to get to grips with the cold light of day quite quickly.  But can it?

JAB