Introduction
Change is happening in Zimbabwe. But its nature is unclear, its trajectory is
unknown and any assumption that it is for the better is very tenuous. What is clear, however, is that it ought to
be an opportunity to lever better outcomes in the future. Managing the change will be a bumpy ride for
people, administrators, government and parties.
It will be disorienting for some; and will fail to satisfy the
(inflated) expectations of others.
Understanding the context within which the change is happening and how
it affects ordinary people will be key. Helping
people, and the groups that they form to represent them, to lever the potential
of whatever change is on offer would be an investment in their resilience in
uncertain times.
The real fragile moment
It is increasingly clear that what is happening in Zimbabwe
now is really internal ZANU-PF politicking being played out with military
means. In that respect, it is not really
a coup – yet. The military, as a
function of the Party, is seeking to ensure that their interests are
protected. That the majority of
Zimbabweans appear to believe that this is a good thing is a sign of the extent
to which the Party (specifically its elites) have captured the state.
Some kind of resolution will almost certainly be achieved. The delay is probably because the one lever
which President Mugabe retains is his ability to deliver the fig leaf of
constitutional due process. What happens
next will be vital. The most likely
outcome – either within the next week or by the end of the year (after the ZANU
Congress) – will be a transition from Mugabe to Emerson Mnangagwa (the
military’s preferred candidate). This
will almost certainly be followed by some kind of Transitional National
Government (TNG) including people (if not parties) from the current
opposition. Vitally – and potentially
controversially for the international community – any such arrangement will
almost certainly include the deferral of the 2018 elections by anything from five
to ten years. (All Zimbabweans, but not
apparently all foreigners, know how divisive and violent a near term election
could be.)
Although the military and their political allies are really
fighting for their own interests, many ordinary Zimbabweans particularly in the
urban and peri-urban areas, have invested a great deal of expectation in the
change which they imagine is coming. And
the military have done little to manage that expectation to reasonable levels.
Any post-Mugabe solution will be accompanied by fever pitch excitement and an assumption
that there really will be jam tomorrow.
Against a backdrop of an almost totally failed economy, high
unemployment and collapsed public services, even the best intentioned of
governments is likely to disappoint the majority of the population.
And Mugabe is not without supporters – at least by default. Older, rural people are likely to view his
departure as the removal of the one certainty – albeit not always a good one –
which has featured in their lives. Powerless
aside from their regular vote in support of him, rural people are ill-equipped
to understand and engage with the changes which will affect them.
The real fragile moment in Zimbabwe, then, is not now as the
big beasts are manoeuvring for advantage, but later when ordinary people realise
that their lives have not improved greatly – if at all. This offers the potential for significant
future destabilisation as the vice-like grip that Mugabe has employed to date
is replaced by a new regime which, by definition, is vulnerable to external
forces and internal bickering.
The opportunity
Recent events in Zimbabwe were not unplanned – although the
timing may not have been that which Mnangagwa or the military might have
chosen. The smooth and hitherto peaceful
way in which the military has acted suggests a significant amount of prior
preparation and planning. This has
almost certainly extended to planning for post-Mugabe government. Mnangagwa knows that he must re-start the
economy; and that this needs to translate swiftly into visible change for the
ordinary citizen. His early statements
when in office will almost certainly focus on moves to correct the "errors" of
the past (five years or so) and steps to attract investment and promote
economic activity – and thereby employment followed by future tax revenue.
In order to move beyond mere rhetoric, Mnangagwa’s government
will need to be seen to deliver. That it
is likely to be a TNG will simultaneously limit his room for (political)
manoeuvre and require him to take into account opposition demands for service
delivery and accountability. This will,
in effect, be an invitation to the population to collaborate with the TNG to
articulate their needs and to hold government to account.
